



# An Analysis of SNC-Lavalin's Risk Assessment Report

Discussion document December 2017

- In June of 2017, a Risk Assessment report for the Lower Churchill Project (LCP) was released to the public that was developed by SNC-Lavalin in 2013
- The Risk Assessment made several assertions about Nalcor Energy - LCMC's risk management practices
- LCMC requested that Westney complete a review of the Risk Assessment to analyze the validity of those assertions



### CIMFP Exhibit P-01847

## Important items to note



- The SNC-Lavalin Risk Assessment for the LCP developed in 2013 was never submitted to Nalcor
- No copy exists in LCMC's comprehensive document control system
- The review was not requested by LCMC management
- The document is identified as "Confidential for SNC-Lavalin Internal Use Only" and was not approved (signed) by Executive VP Scott Thon, who was a sitting member of the Steering Committee for SNC-Lavalin's EPCM services agreement




## CIMFP Exhibit P-01847 Page 4 Assertions made in the 2013 SNC-Lavalin Risk Assessment are not supported by the facts available

Assertions about LCMC's risk management approach	Facts available	Supporting slides
A quantitative evaluation of risk exposure was not completed	<ul> <li>Westney with LCMC and SNC-Lavalin completed a quantitative risk analysis in 2012 prior to sanction</li> </ul>	4
2 The existing LCP risk register did not provide a realistic portrait of actual project risk	<ul> <li>All risks identified by SNC-Lavalin were included in the LCP risk register and considered in Westney's analysis</li> <li>SNC-Lavalin had several participants in Westney's risk identification and ranging sessions (which leveraged the existing LCP risk register)</li> </ul>	5 - 6
3 A clear picture of the total cost- risk exposure was not provided	<ul> <li>The range of outcomes from Westney's analysis were inclusive of the results in SNC-Lavalin's Risk Assessment</li> </ul>	7
	<ul> <li>SNC-Lavalin provided critical cost estimate data to LCP (e.g., concrete installation production rates, costs per cubic meter) and was a key contributor in risk sizing/ranging</li> </ul>	
The risk management function was not empowered	<ul> <li>SNC-Lavalin was compensated for a full-time risk manager and a LCMC senior manager was engaged in the day-to-day risk activities</li> </ul>	
5 Mitigation plans were needed for the top 9 risks identified	<ul> <li>Top risks had been identified prior to sanction, with mitigations planned or already underway in 2013</li> </ul>	8
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## CIMFP Exhibit P-01847 Page 6 All risks included in the SNC-Lavalin Risk Assessment had already been identified by Nalcor-LCMC (1/2)

	Risk title	Included <sup>1</sup>	Nalcor-LCMC reference <sup>2</sup>
	<ul> <li>High market cost from contractors to be expected</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 5 / KR 20
	Concrete works slippage from baseline schedule	$\checkmark$	• KR 20
	River closure slippage from baseline schedule	$\checkmark$	• KR 20
	Limited availability of skilled and experienced manpower	$\checkmark$	• KR 24
	<ul> <li>Major components outsourcing in China</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 26
	<ul> <li>Limited availability of skilled site management personnel</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 22
	<ul> <li>Difficulty transitioning to an integrated team project delivery model</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 43
	<ul> <li>Mobilization of community against the project</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 18 / KR 19
	<ul> <li>Additional delays resulting from difficult early works</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	<ul> <li>**Time-risk analysis variable</li> </ul>
/ery nigh <sup>3</sup>	Large EPC packages	$\checkmark$	• KR 29
	<ul> <li>Insufficient geotechnical information for north spur area</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 23
	Large packages issued for transmission lines	$\checkmark$	• KR 28
	No geotechnical data available	$\checkmark$	• KR 23
	<ul> <li>Lack of control on delivering of Strait of Belle Isle (SOBI) crossing cable</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 11
	<ul> <li>Commissioning failures of T&amp;G units</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 13
	<ul> <li>Insufficient geotechnical information</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 23
	Limited camp accommodation capacity at Muskrat Falls site	$\checkmark$	• R 185/ KR 24
	<ul> <li>No geotechnical information for dam</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 23
	<ul> <li>C3 coordination of packages will be a challenge</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 162
	<ul> <li>Insufficient suppliers' QA/QC</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	R 61 / R 159

<sup>1</sup> Included in Nalcor's Decision Gate 3 Project Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis Report and incorporated into Westney's analysis <sup>2</sup> KR = Key risk, R = Risk <sup>3</sup> SNC-Lavalin risk level based on "probable consequence" (further details on slide 7)



## CIMFP Exhibit P-01847 Page 7 All risks included in the SNC-Lavalin Risk Assessment had already been identified by Nalcor-LCMC (2/2)

	Risk title	Included <sup>1</sup>	Nalcor-LCMC reference <sup>2</sup>
Very high <sup>3</sup>	<ul> <li>Contractors' (or sub-contractors') errors / omissions</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 59
	<ul> <li>Native issues for powerlines in Labrador</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 18
	<ul> <li>Possibility of strike</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 24
	<ul> <li>Underestimating workforce required to accomplish project</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 24
	<ul> <li>Claims arising from contractors or suppliers</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 24
High <sup>3</sup>	<ul> <li>Requirements surrounding environmental assessment release</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 15
	<ul> <li>Complexity of commissioning and system integration</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 13
	<ul> <li>Riverside cofferdam catastrophic flooding</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 12
Medium <sup>3</sup>	<ul> <li>Scope of packages not aligned with suppliers' core businesses</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 147
	<ul> <li>Readiness for start-up might be a challenge</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 13
	<ul> <li>Problematic long lead items</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 51 / R 130
	<ul> <li>Possible dispute for acquiring ROW for approx. 100km of powerlines</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 84
	<ul> <li>Powerlines corridor located in remote areas</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 122 / R 94
	<ul> <li>Delay in availability of admin. building creating inefficient site mgmt.</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	<ul> <li>Not considered a risk (minor issue)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Suitability of site south access road</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 37 / R 130
	<ul> <li>Cost overrun on electrode pond in Labrador</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• R 70
	<ul> <li>Bankruptcy of major LCP contractors or suppliers</li> </ul>	$\checkmark$	• KR 26 / KR 5
Low <sup>3</sup>	Limited camp accommodations capacity at Upper Churchill Falls site	$\checkmark$	• KR 5
	Adverse weather conditions	$\checkmark$	<ul> <li>**Time-risk analysis variable</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Insufficient air travel to LCP sites</li> </ul>	<u> </u>	• KR 24

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## CIMFP Exhibit P-01847 Page 8 The range of outcomes from Westney's analysis were inclusive of the results in SNC-Lavalin's Risk Report

	Westney	SNC-Lavalin		
Cost timing assumptions	<ul> <li>2012 C\$ (at time of estimate)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>End-of-project costs</li> </ul>		
Estimate basis	<ul> <li>C\$5.465 Billion</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>C\$6.1 Billion stated, which is likely inclusive of contingency (the amount was C\$5.8, excluding contingency)</li> </ul>		
<b>Risk identification</b>	<ul> <li>LCP's risk register and collaborative risk identification sessions with SNC- Lavalin and Nalcor</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>LCP's risk register and discussion with SNC-Lavalin internal personnel</li> </ul>		
Risk quantification and modeling	<ul> <li>Ranging of best and worst cases for both "tactical" (i.e., risks around the estimate) and "strategic" risks, with probabilistic modeling of all risks via Monte Carlo simulation techniques</li> </ul>	undformula for probable consequencerisks,("consequence" x "probability" x (all- "manageability))		
Analysis completion	• 2012	<ul> <li>2013 (after several key bid packages had been received)</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>C\$5.8 Billion - C\$8.2 Billion<sup>1</sup> (P5 to</li> </ul>	C\$8.2 Billion (C\$5.8 Billion + C\$2.4		
Cost-risk results	P95, escalated to end-of-project C\$)			
<sup>1</sup> P5 to P95 range in 2012 C\$ is C\$5.5 Billion	n - C\$7.4 Billion			

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## CIMFP Exhibit P-01847 Top risks had been identified by Nalcor prior to Decision Gate 2 (2010), with mitigations planned or already underway in 2013

Risk title	SNC-L risked amount (\$ millions)	Nalcor-LCMC response / actions already underway in 2013
<ul> <li>High market cost from contractors to be expected</li> </ul>	225	<ul> <li>Bidders were aggressively profiled</li> <li>Almost all packages bid had 4 or more bidders</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Limited camp accommodation capacity at Muskrat Falls site</li> </ul>	203	<ul> <li>Design of the "in ground" services was changed to allow for additional camp accommodation blocks to be built as the need arose</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Limited availability of skilled and experienced manpower</li> </ul>	203	<ul> <li>A competitive wage / labour agreement with the Hebron Project was established</li> <li>A high quality camp and accommodations was built (e.g., fiber internet, TVs in all rooms, central gym, cinema, etc.)</li> <li>An aggressive campaign was executed to attract workers from Western Canada</li> <li>Transportation was streamlined (e.g., charter aircraft, bussing from the airport)</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Large packages issued for transmission lines</li> </ul>	180	<ul> <li>First package bid (HVac TL) was broken into small packages. Bid revealed significant savings for larger package which was leveraged for the HVdc TL</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Major components outsourcing in China</li> </ul>	168	<ul> <li>An extensive bidding process was conducted and supplier inspections/quality reviews were completed for the proposed facilities in China</li> <li>LCP had a full-time QA team on-the-ground in China, and quality was good</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Concrete works slippage from baseline schedule</li> </ul>	126	<ul> <li>The project schedule at sanction was recognized as a target schedule with aggressive milestones</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>River closure slippage from baseline schedule</li> </ul>	96	<ul> <li>To further de-risk schedule, a decision was made in March of 2013 to move diversion from 2015 to 2016</li> <li>Mitigations resulted in river closure, diversion, and spillway operation being achieved on schedule</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Large EPC packages</li> </ul>	90	<ul> <li>LCP's financial advisors and rating agencies required large packages that limited interfaces from contractors with global EPC capabilities and high credit- worthiness, with a preference for unit-rate and lump-sum contractors</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>No geotechnical information for dam</li> </ul>	90	<ul> <li>A decision was made that the in-river geotechnical investigations actually offered a much lower cost and schedule risk than portrayed by SNC-Lavalin's geotechnical engineers</li> </ul>

